Global and European Challenges of the Middle East conflict – 2024
Bei diesem Vortrag handelt es sich um die Keynote Address anlässlich der Eröffnung der „European wasatia Graduate School for Peace and Conflict Resolution“ an der Europa-Universität Flensburg im November 2021. Die Ausführungen haben im Zusammenhang mit dem Krieg um Gaza im Gefolge des Terrorakts auf israelischem Boden vom 7. Oktober 2023 neue Aktualität erhalten.
We have come together this afternoon to become witness of an extraordinary event: and hereby I not only refer to the founding of the European Wasatia Graduate School Peace and Conflict Resolution at Europa Universität Flensburg; but we unite for a moment hoping to make an – albeit very very small – step towards a new era in European politics. In fact, this will be the leitmotiv of what I am going to say: yes, the wasatia project is to contribute as an academic venture to peace between Palestinians and Israelis; but if it is not becoming part and pacel of a fundamental process of change within the Middle East at large, of Europe’s capacity as a political actor and of change in the mindset of Europeans towards the Middle East as its neighbourhood – wasatiya, the core of which is reconciliation, may remain an academic exercise.
Of all conflicts which the world has inherited from the era of European imperialism in the 19th and 20th century in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, the conflict over Palestine has remained the most protracted, farreaching, and destabilizing one. It has triggered numerous domestic revolutions and unrest mostly in the Arab world, it has contributed to dispute the legitimacy of many regimes in the Middle East; in the name of the struggle for Palestine regional wars have been waged; acts of terrorism have been perpetrated. On the international level, a couple of times, it pitched the big powers against each other to the extent that the world became afraid that they might go to war over the Middle East. In the name of legitimacy of the state of Israel or the claims of the Palestinians, human rights were disregarded, the principle of justice was overruled by militant action; international organizations such as the United Nations became instrumentalised; eventually, reference was made to religion to prove the validity of the parties‘ pretensions.
Theodor Herzl, the founder of Zionism, in the preface of his programmatic book Der Judenstaat (1896), stated: „Der Judenstaat ist ein Weltbedürfnis, folglich wird er entstehen“ (The Jewish state is a global demand; that is why it is going to come into existence). More than twenty years later, the Balfour Declaration which became part of the British Mandate over Palestine tried to be more balanced: While, on the one hand, it expressed support to establish in Palestine a national home for the Jewish people, it, on the other hand, declared „understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine“. This second part of the declaration has been largely disregarded by the British themselves during the mandate period, and after World War II by the international community including some Arab states and Israel.
After a century of dispute and conflict over Palestine, the „Weltbedürfnis“ („global demand“), as formulated by Theodor Herzl, has changed: The state of Israel in the borders of 1949 is a fact, legitimized by innumerous documents of the international community; so are the rights of the Palestinians, for which they have been struggling since 1948. The „Weltbedürfnis“ now is to see the two people living side by side: peacefully, on equal rights and recognized by the international community.
How can this be brought about? What will the overarching world order, within which this coexistence may come into being, look like? How can reconciliation work out between people who have struggled over such a long period of time? How can reconciliation replace hatred and rightiousnes on both sides? At which point shall the feeling of superiority and arrogance, on one hand, and inferiority and illusion meet in the name of citizenship, mutual empathy and brotherhood? What will be the contribution of those experts who at Europa Universität in Flensburg have been prepared to encourage and to lead both communities to be guided by the vision of a common future and convince them that peace based on reconciliation creates a win-win situation for both communities?
To raise these questions means to address a double utopia: the utopia of a new Middle East on the one hand; and the utopia of a European Community that has the vision, the resoluteness and the capacity to contribute to bring about a new Middle East to the best of its own interests. For this may be regarded for sure: The place of the European Community in the global order of the 21st century will be closely dependent on the quality of its relationship to its Mediterranean/ Middle Eastern neighbourhood.
In fact, the global order under which the Balfour Declaration has been promulgated was the era of European imperialism. The Ottoman era was about to come to its end; years befor (1916) Great Britain, France, and (by the time) Russia had distributed the skin of the bear already. Sitting together in Paris in 1919 and with the Ottoman Empire and the Deutsches Reich as well as the Habsburg empire being defeated and having come to an end, European imperialist powers could materialize their interests. By making the Balfour Declaration part of the Mandate allotted by the League of Nations 1920 in Sanremo to Great Britain, London thought to instrumentalize the emerging Jewish Community in Palestine to play the role of a watchdog of British interests between the Suez Canal and the Indian Subcontinent. This was the beginning of a complex process that, eventually, ended up, exacerbated by the genocide of the Jews perpetrated by the Nazi regime, in the proclamation of Israel in 1948. From the perspective of the Palestinians, this event since then has been perceived as „the catastrophe“ (an-nakba).
Meanwhile, the Arab elites between Morocco and Iraq struggled for independance. When this was achieved after World War II the search for political identity started – beginning with the revolution in Egypt and during the next two decades followed by regime changes in large parts of the Arab world. The new leaders, many of them officers, were ambitious, but lacking a realistic strategy and a rational idea of what they could achieve given the specific traditions and circumstances of their people. Very soon, they were caught in personal ambitions, contesting notions of Arab nationalism, unrealistic concepts of economic and social development, struggle for regional power and absurd alliances against each other. Widespread corruption became the final stage of what begun under the auspices to find their way out of the era of colonialism and imperialism. The struggle against Israel and for the case of the Palestinians was the fig leaf to hide the lack of legitimacy which they were unable to gain from their people. Israel, for its part, started expanding beyond the borders negotiated in 1949 and – disregarding international law – annexed East Jerusalem as well as the Golan Hights. Domestically, while gaining economic strength, nationalist forces begann to dominate the discourse concerning the rights of the Palestinians and to narrow down the spaces for civil society.
European imperialism, indeed, had come to an end. This finally became clear, when the British and French (plus the Israelis) in October 1956 were forced to withdraw from the Suez Canal and – after more than three quarters of a century of British rule - leave the sovereignty over the waterway to the Egyptians. This was brought about by pressure of the USA. It proved that a new era had begun: the era of super power rivalry. The USA and the Soviet Union were vieing for global dominance. Part of their strategy was to look for support on the regional level. The Middle East saw a double divide: between Arab regimes and Israel on one hand; and between so called Arab revolutionary regimes and Arab conservative regimes on the other. For the US, Israel increasingly turned out to be the most reliant and powerful ally to promote „western“ interests. In the „Six-Day-War“ in June 1967 it became definitely clear that from now on both, Israel and the US would dictate the rules of the game in the Middle East. Israel had conquered the West Bank and East Jerusalem. While, in 1956, President Eisenhower had put pressure on Israel to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula, in 1967 the regional and global situation had changed: Washington, from now on, left it to Jerusalem, to deal with Arab leaders over the occupied territories according to its own interests. In fact, Israeli and American interests became conforming to a large extent. The place where this was proven again and again became the UN Security Counsel, where Washinton constantly would vote in Israel‘s favor.
Nevertheless, over the decades there were moments of hope and windows of opportunity. For their failure all parties have to be blamed: Arab governments, the Palestinian movement organized in the PLO, Israel, and the international community including the European Union (EU). The last chance to solve the conflict under the conditions of the existing global order were the Oslo accords concluded in 1993. Any hope that they would lead to a solution was dashed when on September 11, 2001, the Twintowers in New York collapsed hit by a terrorist attack, whose complex origins were deeply rooted in the Middle East – or, to call it by name, - in Arab societies. The once „world conflict“ in the Middle East that had, over the decades, winded down to the question of the future of parts of Palestine and East Jerusalem – geographically a tiny place – disappeared in the shadow of another „world conflict“: the war on terrorism.
The most significant event – more so than the destruction of Iraq by the American invasion of 2003 and the ensuing appearance of a short lived „Islamic State“ - is the Arab uprising which started in Tunisia in December 2010. To call it an „Arab spring“ from the beginning was misleading; for it signalled that soon summer would come, and if it would not, the Arab societies would end up in autumn or even winter. In fact, in historical perspective, the events 2010/11 have to be understood as the third Arab revolt. The first time, Arabs revolted against the imperialistic schemes after World War I: In Palestine against the British and the Zionist movement, in Iraq against the British Mandate, in Syria against the French, in Libya against the Italians and in Morocco against the French and the Spanish – to name just a few. The first Arab revolt was quelled by European powers. The second Arab revolt started in Egypt 1952, when a military putsch led by Gamal Abd-an Nasir overthrew the century old monarchical order, followed over the next two decades by Iraq, Jemen, and Libya. The second Arab revolt, too, failed - now for different reasons. Some of the reasons have been mentioned already. The quality of relations between these so called „revolutionary“ regimes with their people was illustrated when – at the beginning of the uprising in Libya, Qadhafi was shown hiding under an umbrella insulting the people as cockroaches.
It were these cockroaches that challenged the regimes in this third Arab revolt. And, indeed, it was an pan-Arab phenomenon; there was not a single place between Morocco, the Sudan and Yemen up to Iraq , where it would not have been felt in one way or another. Some of the regimes were swept away; so in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Jemen. Others managed to salvage themselves either by political and economic concessions or by force. The central notion of what the masses on the streets were calling for were „dignity“, and constitutionalism, democracy, and elections. Nothing was heard about an Islamic order or Califate.
So, we consider 2011/2012 as the beginning of a long way in the search by the entire Arab World of a new order. The era of European imperialism, which, after World War I, shaped the geopolitical landscape to a large extent (from here the„palestinian question“ arose) is over since more than half a century; so is he era of the East-West conflict, which forced the political actors in the entire Middle East to assemble in a camp led by one or the other global power (and promoted Israel to the position of a dominant actor). The very first steps into the direction of a new order have been successful. But soon the the process was not only halted; elements of the old regimes took over again and intervention by outside regional powers let the Middle East fall into violence and disarray. Syria is not the only case in point, but the most tragic and far reaching one.
It is our firm conviction that this is not the last word in the history of the Middle East. Morover, as every crisis it contains the chance of a new beginning. The enormous energy of mostly young people which we saw during the mass demonstrations in 2011/12 is not like a ghost, which might be pushed back into the bottle; it has evaded out of it and is there to remain outside and work towards change.
Of course, at the moment it seems like utopia. But after the European desaster of World War II and the amount of hatred all over the continent - who, by the time, would have anticipated the dynamics that drove the people in Europe towards overcoming the trenches that seperated the nations against each other and opt for reconciliation to the extent that the ground was laid to build a European Community. The case of Germany and its relations with France, Poland – and - two decades after the annihilation of millions of Jews by Germans – with Israel is just one case in point. U-topia (non-topos) had developed into a Topia: from something not existing into a flourishing European community. The politicians were the architects; the civil society the workers who brought into fruition what the architects had planned. Let me just mention the schemes of youth exchange or city partnerships.
We, this afternoon here in Flensburg, understand ourselves as parts of the civil society building up what the architects hopefully design for the future of the Middle East.
What are key elements of a new order in the Middle East?
- The people freely rule themselves; democratic principals will replace despotism.The way this will be organized, has to be left to the people themselves according to their historical and cultural traditions.
- The rule of law is guaranteed. In many states, at the moment, ruling circles are writing the rules of the game. There is monstrous misuse of the word „terrorism“. If one objects to the rules of the game, one is blamed a „terrorist“. The notion of citizenship has to replace submission.
- Decentralization of power and administration. The high degree of centralization in many states does not correspond neither to the variety of ethnic, religious and cultural realities in the states many of them having artificially been put together in the wake of World War I.
- Protection of minorities. With the nation state as paradigm on which the post World War I political landscape was based, ethnic, religious or cultural minorities were left as second class citizens.
- The relationship between religion and the public space has to be redefined in a way to allow all people to equally participate in the political and social life of the countries.
- Interference into the domestic affairs of other countries and occupation of another people‘s territory is ruled out.
This is the agenda of change in the Middle East. But the Middle East cannot be thought as an isolate entity. For centuries it has been closely related to Europe and Europe to the Middle East. The Ottoman Empire had been recognized as part of the European system of power. Its modernzation (and the modernization of non-Ottoman countries in the Middle East) were inspired by European models and institutions. The political order of the region after the fall of the Ottoman Empire was dictated by European powers – and, finally, the two biggest conflicts in the region, the Palestinian and the Kurdish conflict, are part of the European legacy. It was only after 1945 that Europe had to step back into the shadow of the global conflict between the USA and the Soviet Union. But even in those days, when six European states assembled in the framework of a European Community, the Mediterranean – by the beginning of the 1970ies - was made the first theater of a common foreign policy. By 1995 this was continued under the name of the Barcelona process.
Against this backdrop, it goes without saying that, as the past was common, the future will be common again. With the United States withdrawing from the Middle East, the EU faces the challenge to redefine its relationship with the Middle East as its age old neighbour. Definitely, it can’t fall back to the paradigms of its imperialistic past. By the beginning of the 21st century,it cannot teach the people from an arrogant position of superiority. As partnership on equal footing is precondition of being together in the EU, partnerschip will have to be the precondition to establish a new order around the Mediterranean and beyond in the Middle East.
But at this point we see another utopia disturbing our vision and grand design. Is Europe really capable to act effectively - politically, economically and – at some point – even prudently using military force? Is it willing at all? Overlooking the last two decades, EU has hardly been visible when it comes to solve conflicts , to support people striving for freedom and democracy, and oppose autocratic rulers. Have Europeans become doubtful about their own values? Have they become afraid that these values may be an aquis to be „exported“? To encourage themselves they should listen again to the slogans shouted by the masses and look at the graffitti in Tunis, Cairo, San‘a, Bahrain, in public places in Syria and Libya. Here they can learn what the people really desire in terms of their future. The better part of European legacy still is on what the people in the Middle East are putting their expectations.
There is not very much left Europe can count on. Economically, it is being bypassed by successful economies in Asia; and there are regimes outside Europe which seem to suggest that economic progress, social cohesion and political stability may be better achieved in an authoritarian system. Europe’s attractiveness lies with its values - such as freedom of the people, their equality in running their public affairs, the rule of law equally applied to every citizen, and the state taking care of those in need. These values would constitute the basis of partnership between Europe and its Mediterranean/Middle Eastern neighbourhood. Europe, at the moment, is not lacking attractive values, but the will to stick to them consequently in its policy; it, therefor, is lacking credibility.
To turn, finally, utopia into prophecy: One prophecy concerns the future of Europe and the Middle East at large: The place both areas will have in the future global order depends on the quality of their relationschip with each other – whether it is exclusive or inclusive.
If it is exclusive in the sense that they build up walls and fences in order to shield themselves against each other – the Europeans against „islam“ and „refugees“ etc.; the Middle Easterners against „secularism“, „unbelief“ or „human rights“ as part of a strategy to restore „European imperialism“ – all will be loosers.
If it is inclusive, we can build the future upon a tremendous amount of heritage: of living close to each other, tolerance, cultural achievements and mutual enrichment. This will not just be a spiritual community. Given the enormous material and human resources, of which Europe and the Middle East dispose, and offering huge spaces to freely unfold the human genius – whether he or she has a Muslim, Jewish or Christian background on the basis of values outlined above - this new entity will generate enormous dynamics to face the tremendous challenges of the future.
The vision of real peace in Palestine is part of this vision of an overarching new order. Every society and state will have to decide by itself whether it will join or not. So in Europe, so in the Middle East. So the Palestinian and so the Israeli elites. Recent developments in Israel concerning Arab human rights organisations or settlements demonstrate how urgent it is for the Jewish State, also to critically question whether or not its policy is in conformity with the political order, essentially based on justice, a vast majority of the people in Europe and the Middle East want to live in. And they have to decide , whether or not they want to integrate in an emerging new order or militarily rely on a distant power which has decided to withdraw from the Middle East – and has shown in Afghanistan, how dangerous it is in the long run to base one‘s security upon it.
What do we tell the students who are with us today and who, with all their enthusiasm, want to commit themselves to make a vision of Jewish – Arab living together a reality? I end up with what the late Amos Oz, a famous Israeli writer, wrote when the Israeli and Palestinian leaders shook hands on the lane in front of the White Hous in 1993: „ Old foes handed over their hatred of history; a hundred years of loneliness in the land of Israel come to an end. We have to defuse the emotional mines in the hearts of both people. I do not know , how life of our grandchildren will be; but this week, both people for the first time in one century of blindnes looked at each other‘s eyes and said: you, too, are a people; both people are here.“
I wish our students that they experience this moment, too. Simply to hear: both people are here. This will be the beginning of reconciliation, which seems to be a simple word, but, in reality, is so difficult to practice that it needs a Graduate School at Europa Universität Flensburg to learn about it.
Flensburg, 4.November 2021